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Meaning and reference:
the interpretation of
general terms
by Ross Charnock
This is the second of two articles adapted from a lecture given to the
Statute Law Society at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on October
1, 2007. The first concerned direct reference to individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Reference to classes and natural kinds is necessarilymore complex than reference to specific objects orindividuals, not just because there is no direct
reference to anything in particular, but also because
reference is made to concepts rather than to empirical
objects. Both lawyers and linguists have found definitions
based on fixed criteria to be unsatisfactory. The
interpretation of general terms has been considered
problematic since at least Heydon’s case, 76 ER 637
(1584).
In linguistics, related concepts are commonly
distinguished through an analysis of semantic features.
Thus chairs are distinguished from armchairs or stools
through the presence or absence of “backs” and “arms”,
while young fur seals, young knights, university graduates
and unmarried men, all referred to as “bachelors”, have in
common markers like “animate”, “human”, “male” or
“lowest degree” (Katz and Fodor, 1963). Such markers
supply an approximate definition of a given word. For legal
purposes, the relevant common features play an obvious
role in ejusdem generis interpretation. However, they are
rarely sufficient for purposes of definition. (The Pope is
both male and unmarried, but he is probably not a
“bachelor”.)
In order to reduce reliance on personal intuition, and to
ensure objectivity, lawyers often give more and more
elaborate definitions, multiplying the applicable criteria as
necessary. It is one of the more important functions of the
higher courts to adjust such definitions, where possible
(but no more than necessary), in order to take account of
the new problems.
Unfortunately, as was pointed out by Waismann
(Verification, 1951), such definitions can never be complete.
The reason is that things are associated with an indefinite
number of semantic features, some of which have not yet
been noticed, while others may never be noticed by
anyone. The examples Waismann proposes are admittedly
somewhat extreme. They involve, among other things, a
new kind of gold which emits radiation, or cats which
speak Latin. He admits that such things do not occur in
real life, but answers (1951, 120): “[...] We can never
exclude altogether the possibility of some unforeseen
situation arising in which we shall have to modify our
definition.” As it is not possible to envisage all possible
situations, or every new discovery, all definitions must
remain uncertain and unreliable. Waismann concludes
(1951: 123): “Every definition stretches into an open
horizon. Can you foresee all the facts which would turn a
putative fact into a delusion?” This was his problem of
open texture.
It is often assumed that the concepts associated with
general terms must have at least one feature in common.
This claim was made explicitly by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v
Stevenson [1932] AC 562: “And yet the duty which is
common to all cases where liability is established must
logically be based upon some element common to the cases
where it is found to exist.” This idea seems initially
plausible, yet it is logically mistaken, as was pointed out by
Wittgenstein in his discussion of family resemblances
(Philosophical investigations 1953, para 66): “Consider for
example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and
so on. [...] if you look at them you will not see something
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a
whole series of them at that.”
Given that the number of possible semantic features is
indeterminate, no member of a family can possess them all.
It follows that no single feature will necessarily be shared
by all the members. Wittgenstein considers the assumption
that different games have in common the disjunction of
their common properties, as “naive”. This corresponds
well with Lord Macmillan’s prescient warning in Donoghue:
“the categories of negligence are never closed”.
“TRUE AND CORRECT” MEANINGS
On the traditional view, the extension of a general term,
the set of things to which the term applies, is defined by
reference to fixed criteria. However the extension cannot
exhaust the meaning of a given expression, as then
different expressions used to refer to identical sets would
be synonymous. Quine gave the example of a “creature
with a heart”, which on the purely referential view would
have the same meaning as “creature with a kidney”.
Although the two expressions have the same extension, the
connotation or intended meaning may vary. This shows
that there is a fundamental distinction between meaning
and reference, also referred to in semantics as extension vs.
intension (or in Fregean terms, as Sinn vs. Bedeutung). On
this view, the intension is the subjective element of
meaning, a private mental entity rather than a shared,
public property.
Putnam (Is semantics possible?, 1970) rejects the
traditional view, pointing out that criterial definitions falsify
the properties of words. He reminds us that members of a
natural kind may have abnormal members (“green lemons”
or “three-legged tigers”). He points out (The meaning of
meaning, 1975) that while the extension can only be a set
of things, a “yes/no” object, a tree for example is in fact a
fuzzy concept.
It is generally accepted that two terms can have same
extension yet differ in intension. Putnam (Are meanings in
the head?, 1975) goes further, establishing that the converse
is also true. In a celebrated thought experiment, he
supposes a twin earth (Twearth), exactly like Earth except
that water is not H2O but XYZ. A spaceship from Earth
will report “On Twearth the word ‘water’ means ‘XYZ’”.
Symmetrically, a Twearthian spaceship will report “On
earth ‘water’ means ‘H2O’”. So far this is just a question
of ambiguity, the word having one extension on Earth and
another on Twearth. However, if relations with Twearth
had taken place in 1750, when there was no knowledge of
chemistry on either earth, then no one would have known
that the word “water” was ambiguous. Yet the extensions
were in fact different, as we now know.
Putnam goes on to point out that even on Earth at the
present time, pots and pans may be made out of
“molybdenum” rather than aluminium. To non-experts,
these two elements appear to be indistinguishable. For
ordinary people using these words, there is therefore no
difference in psychological state, yet the extensions of the
terms still differ. Putnam himself famously claimed not to
know the difference between an elm and a beech tree.
Thus for him the concepts were identical, even though the
words in fact have different extensions. The inevitable
conclusion is that meaning cannot be fixed by description
and must vary according to the knowledge and beliefs of
the speaker (or the legislature).
This explains why references to dictionary definitions in
legal judgments are rarely dispositive. Take the definition of
“male” given by Lord Hope in Bellinger v Bellinger [2003]
AC 21: “The definition of ‘male’ in the New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (1993) tells us that its primary meaning
when used as an adjective is ‘of, pertaining to, or
designating the sex which can beget offspring.’” If this
capacity was made obligatory, not only would it exclude
transsexual marriage, it would also invalidate numerous
more conventional marriages. Note also the definition of
“appropriates” cited by Lord Lowry (dissenting) in DPP v
Gomez [1993] AC 442: “The primary dictionary meaning
is ‘take possession of, or take to oneself, especially without
authority’, and that is in my opinion the meaning which
the word bears in section1(1) [of the Theft Act 1968].” Not
only did this fail to dispose of the case, it was actually
rejected by the majority.
STEREOTYPES
Putnam (1970) therefore rejects definitions of natural
kinds which depend on conjunctions of properties. While
he agrees that lemons are usually yellow and taste bitter, he
refuses to accept that all lemons must necessarily have
those properties. On the contrary, “to say that something
is a lemon is to say that it belongs to a natural kind whose
normal members have certain properties; but not to say
that it necessarily has those properties itself.” His
conclusion is that: “There are no analytic truths of the
form ‘Every lemon has p’. We remember that, although
‘Jif ’ lemons were plastic, they were still called ‘lemons’.
Similarly, ‘water’ cannot be defined as H2O, as that word is
more usually used to refer to what is found in lakes or what
comes out of the tap. It is an empirical question how we
will refer to pencils, if in the future we discover that they
are (and have always been) organisms, or to ‘cats’ if they
turn out to be robots remotely controlled from Mars”.
More prosaically, although a cup is distinguished from a
beaker through the presence of a handle, we do not know
in advance whether we will still call it by that name if its
handle falls off.
Putnam (1975) therefore developed a theory of
reference to natural kinds in terms of ‘stereotypes’. The
stereotype corresponds to the conventional idea of the
kind under consideration (stereotypical tigers are striped,
and stereotypical gold is yellow); but the basic features
evoked are never analytically necessary. Thus albino tigers
need not be considered logically contradictory, and we can
accept without incoherence that chemically pure gold is in
fact white. Clearly, stereotypes are reasonably accurate for
normal purposes; otherwise there would be no
communication. 25
Amicus Curiae Issue 73 Spring 2008
Stereotypes in the law
The concept of stereotypes was introduced as an
account of everyday communication. However, they also
feature in legal argument. In Mandla v Dowell Lee CA [1982]
3 WLR 932, for example, a Sikh claimed that the refusal to
admit his son to a private school unless he wore the school
uniform (instead of his turban) constituted indirect racial
discrimination under the RRA 1976. The CA took a
traditional approach, and held unanimously that the Sikhs
did not constitute a “race” as defined in the OED.
Mandla’s claim was therefore rejected. It was recognised
that the term ‘race’ was problematic. Indeed, some
scientists and social anthropologists denied that it had any
meaning at all. (As Parliament must have meant something,
Lord Kerr considered that the concept should be judicially
defined by reference to colour.)
In the RRA 1976, an alternative definition is given in
terms of “ethnic origin”. However, this term was also
problematic. Denning LJ adopted the definition given in
the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1934: “That was the meaning
given which I – acquiring my vocabulary in 1934 – have
always myself attached to the word ‘ethnic’. It is, to my
mind, the correct meaning. It means ‘pertaining to race’.”
The definitions given in more recent dictionaries were even
less helpful. The latest edition of the OED gave: “foreign or
exotic; un-American or plain quaint”, while the Collins
English Dictionary 1979 unhelpfully gave “Bosnian ethnic
dances” as an illustration of the relevant concept. The CA
determined that the term should not be taken to apply to
any characteristic which could be assumed or rejected as a
matter of choice, Oliver LJ pointing out that: “No one, for
instance, in ordinary speech, would describe a member of
the Church of England or the Conservative Party as a
member of an ethnic group.”
However, when the case reached the HL the following
year ([1983] 2 AC 548), their Lordships adopted a very
different approach to definition. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
proposed a number of “essential conditions” for
consideration as a race (a long shared history, a cultural
tradition, a common geographical origin, a common
language, a common literature, a common religion and
being a minority within a larger community). However
these conditions were not considered to be necessary. They
were thought of instead as part of the relevant stereotype.
Thus, for the purposes of the Act, a group defined by
reference to “enough of these characteristics” should be
accepted as a “race”. Lord Templeman took a similar
approach to the definition of “ethnic”: “[...] a group of
persons defined by reference to ethnic origins must possess
some of the characteristics of a race [...]. The evidence
shows that the Sikhs satisfy these tests. They are more than
a religious sect, they are almost a race and almost a nation.”
Having adopted a different approach to definition, the
Lords unanimously reversed the decision given by the CA.
PROTOTYPES
An alternative approach to the interpretation of general
terms is found in the theory of prototypes (Rosch, Prototype
classification and logical classification, 1983). In this cognitive
model of understanding, the idea of definition is rejected
altogether. Instead, the meaning is supplied through
examples. The best instances of the type referred to by a
given general term are said to be prototypical, while others
are classed as peripheral. In this theory, as with
stereotypes, there is no true or false test for the use of a
word. Rather, examples are evaluated as more or less
appropriate. This model has proved productive in
psycholinguistics, and has led to testable hypotheses
concerning language acquisition. It works well as an
account of natural language understanding, to the extent
that we have shared ideas of best instances. It is generally
agreed, for example, that an oak is a prototypical tree,
while (in England and America) a robin may be the best
instance of a bird. Although an ostrich is technically a bird,
speakers agree that it is a less central example. For
particular purposes, whales may be classed as fish, or
tomatoes as vegetables.
Prototype theory was originally applied to nouns,
especially natural kind words. However, the notion of
“core meaning” also extends to verbs. Thus the verb “to
break” is thought to be used more prototypically in
“breaking a cup” than in “a wave breaking.” In the same
way, the core meaning of “to run” is more likely to be
associated with running a race than with running a risk (or
a company).
Prototypes in legal adjudication
Legal adjudication is often based on prototypical
reasoning. A convenient example is found in Nix v Heddon
149 US 304 (1893). The American Tariff Act 1883 imposed
a duty on “vegetables” at “ten per centum ad valorem”.
When the authorities attempted to charge the 10 per cent
duty on tomatoes, it was pointed out, reasonably enough,
that a tomato was not a vegetable but a fruit. At trial,
counsel for the plaintiff read in evidence definitions of the
words “fruit” “vegetables” and “tomato” from Webster’s
Dictionary, and called witnesses to show that the words had
no special meaning in trade or commerce, different from
those read. The defendant’s counsel then read the
definitions of the words “pea”, “egg plant”, “cucumber”,
“squash” and “pepper”. No other evidence was offered by
either party.
Justice Gray – distinguished author of Nature and sources
of the law, 1909, and of the minority opinion in Riggs v
Palmer 22 N.E. 188 (1889) – nevertheless pointed out that:
“In the common language of the people [...] all these are
vegetables, which are [...] like potatoes, carrots, parsnips,
[...] usually served at dinner with the fish or meats [...], and
not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”.26
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While stereotypes and prototypes are alternative
accounts of the cognitive processes involved in natural
language understanding, they are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, dictionary definitions commonly include both
criterial definitions and examples. Further, an intuition
based on prototypes may be reinforced or justified where
necessary by reference to stereotypical features, as is
frequently observed in legal argument.
In United Biscuits v Customs and Excise VAT Tribunal
91/160 (1991), the Tribunal had to decide whether “Jaffa
cakes” were in fact cakes (and therefore zero rated for
VAT). Chocolate-covered biscuits, as “luxury items”,
would be liable for the normal rate. As the products in
question were not prototypical cakes, the court had to
decide whether they should nevertheless be accepted as
peripheral examples.
However, although the case depended mainly on the
judge’s intuitive recognition of the relevant kind, legal
argument was based not on prototypes, but on semantic
features. The customs authorities argued that Jaffa cakes
are the size of biscuits, packaged as biscuits, eaten with
fingers like biscuits, and kept on the biscuit shelf at the
supermarket. United Biscuits pointed out other
unsuspected characteristics, more favourable to their case
(a biscuit goes soft when stale, whereas a Jaffa cake, like a
cake, goes hard). The company managed to convince the
judge that the criterion of size was of secondary
importance, apparently by offering him a specially
prepared 12-inch Jaffa cake. No doubt HM Customs
lacked the facilities to rebut this argument with a 12-inch
chocolate-covered biscuit. Potter QC concluded that:
“Jaffa cakes have sufficient characteristics of cakes to
qualify as cakes within the meaning of item number 1 in
group 1 of the fifth schedule. If it be relevant, I also
determine that the Jaffa cakes are not biscuits.”
Open texture
Hart (The Concept of Law, 1961), introduced his concept
of ‘open texture’ as follows: “There will indeed be plain
cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which
general expressions are clearly applicable (‘If anything is a
vehicle a motor-car is one), but there will also be cases
where it is not clear whether they apply or not. (Does
‘vehicle’ used here include bicycles, airplanes, roller-
skates?)” (Hart 1961: 126).
Although the linguistic problem figures here almost as an
afterthought, in parentheses, it appears to correspond
closely to the theory of prototypes. The “motor car” is
prototypical, whereas the other examples of “vehicles” are
peripheral, or in Hart’s terms, part of the penumbra
associated with the concept. Yet Hart refers explicitly in his
famous endnotes to Waismann, whose theory of open
texture was related not to vagueness, or to peripheral
features, but rather to the indeterminacy of the central
concepts themselves. Hart may have failed to appreciate
the problems of indeterminacy raised by Waismann,
preferring instead to suppose that judicial discretion is
required only in “hard cases”. Alternatively, he may be
thought to have invented the notion of prototypes more
than 20 years before the term was introduced into
linguistics.
The fact remains that Hart raised new theoretical
problems concerning the semantics of general terms in the
law, some of which actually occurred in practice. The
definition of “vehicle” was the subject of Garner v Burr
[1951] 1 KB 31, included in Hart’s first reading list for his
Oxford law students. A farmer had strapped wheels to his
chicken coop and towed it along the road with his tractor,
contrary to a rule in the Road Traffic Act 1930, forbidding
the use of vehicles without rubber tyres on the public
highway. When prosecuted, his successful defence was that
his chicken coop was not a vehicle. On appeal, Goddard CJ
accepted that a “vehicle” is primarily a means of
conveyance with wheels or runners used for the carriage of
persons or goods, and further that nothing was being
carried in the poultry shed at the relevant time. He
nevertheless held that an offence had been committed, and
that the magistrates “ought to have found that this poultry
shed was a vehicle within the meaning of section 1 of the
Road Traffic Act of 1930”.
Chicken coops do not correspond to any stereotypical
definition of “vehicle”; nor can they realistically be thought
of as a peripheral example of the concept. This kind of
interpretation goes far beyond any periphery (perhaps even
beyond the Staines by-pass). Such understanding depends
crucially on specific purposes in particular situations, as in
the contextualist theory of “what is said”.
CONTEXTUALISM
Meanings are said to be ambiguous where contextual
knowledge is required to supply the deictic references and
to select the appropriate sense. Where this information is
unavailable, possibly because the words must be
interpreted in a context which was never envisaged by the
speaker, the meaning is pragmatically indeterminate. This
is often the case in statute construction, as with
‘appropriates’ in theft (Lawrence v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner [1972] AC 626 or DPP v Gomez [1993] AC
442), or even “entry” in R v Collins [1972] 2 All ER 1105.
The role of the background context in semantic
interpretation was debated at length in a series of American
cases concerning the interpretation of a Federal law
providing for severe minimum sentences where a firearm is
“used or carried” during the commission of “any felony”
related to drugs (18 U.S.C. ß 924(c)(1)). In Smith v US 508
U.S. 223 (1993), it appeared that, after some negotiation
with an undercover police officer, Smith had misguidedly
offered to trade his automatic weapon for four ounces of
cocaine. The Supreme Court had to decide whether this
constituted “use” of the firearm. 27
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Justice O’Connor admitted that the relevant phrase
would normally evoke an image of “use for shooting”.
However, having considered the definitions given in a
number of dictionaries, including Webster’s (“to convert
to one’s service” or “to employ”) she considered that
other uses could not be excluded, and therefore accepted
“use for barter” as within the statute. The minimum
sentence, in this case 30 years’ imprisonment, was
therefore imposed. Justice Scalia, dissenting, protested
that: “The court does not appear to grasp the distinction
between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is
used.” He claimed that: “the plain meaning of the word
must be drawn from the context in which it is used.”
Following this decision, an article was published giving
the linguistic perspective on this debate (“Using common
sense”, Cunningham/Fillmore, 1995). It was pointed out
that the meaning of a word may differ within a single
sentence. Thus in: “I use a gun to protect my house, but
I’ve never had to use it”, the first occurrence refers to “use
for reassurance” while the other is related to “use as a
weapon”. This insight appeared relevant in Bailey v United
States 516 U.S. 137 (1995), in which the same statute was
reinterpreted. This time, the accused was said to have
“used” a gun by keeping it in the car boot while
transporting marijuana. The USSC now found that the
statute did not apply, citing in argument
Cunningham/Fillmore’s invented example. However, in a
third case, Muscarello v US 524 US 125 [1998], the accused
was found instead to have “carried” the gun in the glove
compartment of his car. In support of this interpretation,
Justice Breyer cited a statistical analysis of an electronic
newspaper corpus: “Random sampling suggests that many,
perhaps more than one third, are sentences used to convey
the meaning at issue here.” He noted, reassuringly, that the
Bible refers repeatedly to goods being “carried” on
chariots or young asses, and considered that other possible
meanings were not relevant. In dissent, Justice Ginsberg
wondered pointedly what other meanings may have
“showed up some two thirds of the time”.
Recurrent difficulties of this kind show that it would be
it would be more satisfactory to abandon the assumption
that meanings can be fixed by authoritative definition, and
to recognise instead the importance of background context
in interpretation. On this view, the natural or plain
meaning, as observed in context, is no longer taken to be
equivalent to “literal meaning”. Instead, interpretation is
based on “what is said”.
Literal meaning and “what is said”
Traditional theory involves a binary distinction between
an invariant semantic meaning, associated with the
sentence-type, and a pragmatic, intentional meaning
associated with the utterance. Given this distinction, it
becomes necessary to show how the communicative
intention can be derived from the postulated literal
meaning. Grice (1957) famously proposed a set of maxims
intended to formalise the principles required for pragmatic
interpretation in ordinary conversation. These work well
where understanding depends on conversational
implicature in specific contexts, for example where an
utterance like “It’s warm in here” is taken as a request to
open the window, or “I have seen that film” as indicating a
preference for another.
Unfortunately, this theory cannot be empirically
verified. As all utterances are made in specific situations,
and as by definition, the context must always have an effect
on interpretation, the literal meaning is in practice
unobservable. Problems appear with sentences like “Mary
has drunk two glasses of wine”, or “Odette has three
children”, which are logically equivalent to “Mary has
drunk ‘at least’ two glasses of wine”, or “Odette has ‘at
least’ three children”. The understanding that Mary has
consumed “only” two glasses, or that Odette has “only”
three children must therefore be explained through the
machinery of conversational implicature.
Travis (The uses of sense, 1989) proposes a more realistic
account, which shows how basic meanings and even truth-
values vary according to context. To take just one of his
many examples, a simple affirmative sentence including the
natural kind term “milk” may appear true or false on
different sayings, according to purpose. Thus, “There is
milk in the fridge” will be considered true by someone
about to prepare breakfast, if the fridge contains a carton
of milk, but false if there is just a puddle of milk on the
shelf. However, for someone checking on whether her
husband has cleaned the kitchen properly, the opposite
would be the case. Neither interpretation could be derived
from a putative literal meaning, which would involve
something like a fridge full of (wall-to-wall) milk.
In the same way, a sentence like “The water’s blue
today” would be true for someone admiring the view of a
lake in midsummer; yet the same sentence, spoken on the
same day, and referring to the water in the very same lake,
may well be evaluated differently by someone investigating
pollution levels. Again, a literal interpretation would be
rejected as self-contradictory, for it is well known that
water is not in fact blue, but colourless. In this
contextualist model, the semantic meaning (“what is said”)
depends on the domain of discourse.
On this account of natural understanding, contrary to
the judicial tradition, there is no literal meaning, even on
an abstract, purely theoretical level. The discourse context
does not simply provide a basis for disambiguation, but
actually establishes the sense of “what is said”. This does
not of course exclude recourse to conversational
implicature, as a specific pragmatic understanding may
unproblematically be derived from the general semantic
sense. Thus one sense of “there is milk in the fridge” may
implicate an invitation to prepare cornflakes, while the
other may carry a suggestion that the fridge should be
cleaned again.28
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Although English judges often claim to be basing their
interpretation on the “literal” meaning of the words, rather
than on hypotheses concerning legislative intention, they
nevertheless recognise that no understanding is possible
without reference to the supposed purpose in the given
discourse situation. They even go so far as to speak of the
“literal meaning in context”. As literal meaning is by
definition acontextual, this phrase appears at first sight to
be a simple contradiction in terms. However, it should
perhaps be interpreted more charitably, as corresponding
to the linguistic concept of “what is said”. Notice in
support of this view that English judges seem to have
adopted the word “colour” as a grammatical term, when
referring to the importance of context in the interpretation
of general terms. In AG v Prince Ernest-Augustus [1957] AC
436, Viscount Simonds stated that “Words, and
particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation,
their colour and content are derived from their context.”
Similarly, in Bourne v Norwich Crematorium [1967] 1 All ER
576, Stamp J pointed out that: “English words derive
colour from those which surround them.”
CONCLUSION - SEMANTICS AND
PRECEDENT
Hart (1961: 126) rejects the popular but simplistic
distinction between the “the uncertainties of
communication by authoritative example (precedent), and
the certainties of communication by authoritative general
language (legislation)”. His invented example (1961: 124)
is: “Every man and boy must take his hat off when entering
a church”, as opposed to: “Look, this is the right way to
behave on such occasions.” Although he is reluctant to
accept sceptical claims of radical indeterminacy, he
considers the distinction between written rules and
common law precedents to be less clear than is commonly
assumed, and suggests that the rules given in written
statutes may be no more determinate than the instructions
implicit in precedents. Hart’s parallel between should be
taken further.
In prototype theory, the meanings of general terms
depend not on definition, but rather on representative
examples. Uncertainties are more likely to arise in
peripheral cases. The same is true of legal precedents, the
application of which depends on the extent to which the
case is considered representative, or “in point”. In the
theory of stereotypes, the sense of general terms depends
on generally accepted ideas about which properties or
semantic features are fundamental. Just as it is often
unclear how precedents should apply in new, unenvisaged
contexts, communication is often problematic when words
are applied in new ways in new circumstances.
In Waismann’s theory of open texture, problems arise
where hitherto undiscovered semantic features turn out to
be relevant to ideas of central concepts. In the same way,
certain aspects of an earlier decision may remain unnoticed
until a new, unenvisaged situation arises. A new
interpretation of Derry v Peek [1889] 14 AC 337 was
proposed in Candler v Crane Christmas [1951] 2 KB 164, and
finally accepted in Hedley Byrne [1963] AC 465.
In contextual semantics, the parallel with the rule of
precedent is even clearer. On this view, meaning depends
on shared knowledge in a given context. This tacit
knowledge can only be derived from previous usage in
similar situations. In his extended discussion of the
contextualist debate, Recanati (Literal meaning, 2004: 143)
summarises the point in this way: “The applicability of a
term to novel situations depends on its similarity to the
source situations. The target situation must be similar to
the source situations not only with respect to the ‘explicit’
definition of the term, but also with respect to the hidden
background. If the two situations diverge, it will be unclear
whether the term will be applicable.” This corresponds
closely to questions regularly raised in legal argument
concerning precedents.
In his theory of “Meaning Eliminativism”, Recanati
(2004: 146) rejects the concept of literal meaning and
refers instead to “semantic potential”. A similar notion is
often evoked in statute construction, where meanings are
often said to be “wide enough” to extend to a new use. In
Julius v Oxford (Bishop) [1880] 5 AC 214, the HL had to
decide the meaning of the deontic may and similar power-
conferring expressions like “it shall be lawful” in the Church
Discipline Act 1889. It was held that such expressions could
be interpreted in particular circumstances as referring not
to a power but to a duty. Yet, although the meaning of may
was said to be wide enough to include the coercive sense of
must or shall, the court refused to consider it as ambiguous.
Such power-conferring expressions were declared to be
the same “whether there is or is not a duty or obligation to
use the powers which they confer.” Like Recanati (2004),
Lord Selbourne described the meaning as merely
“potential”.
Just as the law depends on interpretations decided in
relevant precedents, linguistic understanding depends on
shared knowledge of previous usage. In a cumulative
process, new uses, like new precedents may affect the
semantics of general terms. For this reason, their sense can
never be fixed. In spite of the perpetual search for the Holy
Grail of a determinate meaning, based on objective
definition, the reference of general terms thus remains an
empirical question to be decided in all the circumstances
as cases arise.
29
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